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Many new and emerging RNA and DNA viruses are zoo-
notic or have zoonotic origins in an animal reservoir that is 
usually mammalian and sometimes avian. Not all zoonotic 
viruses are transmissible (directly or by an arthropod vec-
tor) between human hosts. Virus genome sequence data 
provide the best evidence of transmission. Of human trans-
missible virus, 37 species have so far been restricted to 
self-limiting outbreaks. These viruses are priorities for sur-
veillance because relatively minor changes in their epidemi-
ologies can potentially lead to major changes in the threat 
they pose to public health. On the basis of comparisons 
across all recognized human viruses, we consider the char-
acteristics of these priority viruses and assess the likelihood 
that they will further emerge in human populations. We also 
assess the likelihood that a virus that can infect humans 
but is not capable of transmission (directly or by a vector) 
between human hosts can acquire that capability.
A series of recent emerging infectious disease outbreaks, including the 2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epi-
demic in West Africa and the continuing Zika virus disease 
epidemic in the Americas, have underlined the need for 
better understanding of which kinds of pathogens are most 
likely to emerge and cause disease in human populations. 
Many, although not all, emerging infectious diseases are 
caused by viruses, and these frequently emerge from non-
human host reservoirs (1–3). The enormous diversity (4) 
and high rates of evolution (5) of viral pathogens discour-
age attempts to predict with any precision which ones are 
most likely to emerge in humans. However, there is some 
consensus, at least in general terms, regarding the kinds of 
traits that are most essential in determining the capacity of 
a virus to infect, cause disease, and spread within human 
populations (Table 1). We focus on one of these traits, the 
capacity of a virus to spread from one human to another 
(by any transmission route other than deliberate laboratory 
exposure), a key determinant of the epidemic potential of 
a virus.
A theoretical framework for studying the dynamics of 
infectious disease outbreaks is well established (6). The ca-
pacity of an infectious disease to spread in a host population 
can be quantified in terms of its basic reproduction number, 
R0. R0 is defined as the average number of secondary cases 
generated by a single primary case in a large, previously 
unexposed host population, and its value tells us a great 
deal about the epidemiology of a pathogen. R0 = 0 indicates 
no spread in that population; this value would apply to zoo-
notic infections that do not spread between humans. R0 in 
the range 0<R0<1 indicates that chains of transmission are 
possible but that outbreaks will ultimately be self-limiting. 
R0>1 indicates that major epidemics can occur or that the 
disease may become endemic in that host population. A 
higher value of R0 also indicates that a greater reduction in 
transmission rates must be achieved to control an epidemic 
(6). R0 values have been estimated for >60 common human 
pathogens (7), including human influenza A virus (R0<2), 
measles virus (R0<18), and dengue virus (R0<22).
R0 is determined by a combination of pathogen traits, 
such as its transmission biology, which is itself a complex 
interplay between the within-host dynamics of the patho-
gen and the host response to infection, and host traits, such 
as demography, behavior, genetics, and adaptive immunity. 
Consequently, for any given infectious disease, R0 can vary 
between host species and between host populations. Infec-
tious diseases with R0 close to 1 are a particular concern 
because small changes in their epidemiologies can lead to 
major changes in the threat they pose to public health (8).
R0 is closely related to another conceptual approach to 
disease emergence, the pathogen pyramid. There are differ-
ent versions of this scheme (3,9). We consider a pyramid 
of 4 levels (Figure 1). Level 1 represents the background 
chatter of pathogens to which humans are continually or 
sporadically exposed but most of which are not capable of 
causing infection. Other levels can be considered in terms 
of the R0 of the pathogen in humans: level 2 corresponds to 
R0 = 0, level 3 to 0<R0<1, and level 4 to R0>1.
Data and Analysis
Identifying and Characterizing Level 3 and 4 Viruses
We updated our previous systematic literature review 
(10) of the capacity of virus species to transmit be-
tween humans (i.e., level 3 and level 4 viruses; online 
Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/ar-
ticle/22/12/16-0123- Techapp1.pdf). Such viruses are 
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found in 25 of 29 families containing viruses that infect 
mammals or birds (discounting 2 reports of family No-
daviridae species in mammals/birds). The 4 exceptions 
comprise 2 families that have no known human-infective 
viruses (Arteriviridae and Birnaviridae) and 2 with spe-
cies that have been reported in humans but only at level 2 
(Asfarviridae and Bornaviridae).
A total of 22 of these families contain level 4 viruses 
with epidemic potential in humans (sometimes described 
as human-adapted viruses) (11). This finding indicates that 
this capability is widely distributed among virus taxa. The 
3 families with level 3 viruses but no level 4 viruses are the 
Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, and Rhabdoviridae.
A list of 37 presumptive level 3 virus species is pro-
vided in Table 2. These species cover a wide taxonomic 
range and a variety of transmission routes, including vec-
torborne. Several level 3 viruses have historically been as-
sociated with sizeable outbreaks (>100 cases) in human 
populations: Bwamba, Oropouche, Lake Victoria Marburg, 
Sudan Ebola, and o’nyong-nyong viruses. For some other 
viruses, including Guanarito, Junin, lymphocytic chorio-
meningitis, and Sabia (all arenaviruses); simian virus 40; 
Titi monkey virus; and influenza A(H5N1) virus, human-
to-human transmission is rare or merely suspected. In addi-
tion, several viruses are only known or believed to transmit 
between humans by iatrogenic routes or vertical transmis-
sion; this group (Table 2) might be regarded as unlikely 
epidemic threats.
When a virus is transmitted by a vector, it can be par-
ticularly difficult to confirm or exclude the infectiousness 
of human cases, as with Semliki forest, Barmah forest, and 
Rift Valley fever viruses. Similarly, even when human–
vector–human transmission is believed to occur, it is often 
difficult to quantify its contribution to a given outbreak, as 
with Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus.
Level 2 viruses are those that can infect humans (>100 
species) but have never been reported to be transmitted by 
humans (10). In at least some instances, such as influenza 
A(H5N1) virus (12), this finding is attributable to tissue 
tropisms during human infection that are incompatible with 
onward transmission.
Shifts in pyramid level equate to shifts in the public 
health threat posed by a virus. We consider possible shifts 
in the following sections.
Level 1 to Levels 3 and 4
Virus species of mammalian and, more rarely, avian origin 
are sometimes observed to be transmissible between humans 
when first found in humans, which constitutes a jump from 
level 1 straight to level 3 or 4 (Figure 1), and events of this 
kind have been reported regularly. Recent examples that 
appear on the basis of available evidence to fit this model 
include severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(first reported in humans in 2003), Bundibugyo Ebolavirus 
(2008), Lujo virus (2009), severe fever with thrombocyto-
penia syndrome virus (2011), and Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) (2012).
We still have incomplete knowledge of the diversity of 
viruses that infect mammals and birds; the few hundred rec-
ognized species (4) surely represent only a small fraction of 
the total (3). Moreover, we have few predictors of potential 
human-to-human transmissibility. One possible indicator 
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Table 1. Virus traits potentially relevant for capacity to emerge and cause disease in human populations* 
Trait Definition 
Reservoir host relatedness Viruses derived from specific host taxa (e.g., other primate species might be of increased concern) 
Virus relatedness Particular virus taxa might be predisposed to infect, cause disease, and transmit among humans 
Virus host range Viruses with a broad or narrow host range might be of greatest concern 
Evolvability Higher substitution rates might make it easier for some viruses to adapt to human hosts 
Host restriction factors Host factors, many still to be identified, are a barrier to viral infection and help determine which viruses 
can and cannot emerge 
Transmission route Certain transmission routes might predispose viruses to emerge in humans 
Virulence Certain virus or host factors might determine whether a virus causes mild or severe disease in humans 
Hostvirus coevolution Lack of a shared evolutionary history might be associated with higher virulence 
*Adapted from Morse et al. (3). 
 
Figure 1. Pathogen pyramid for RNA and DNA viruses. Level 1 
indicates viruses to which humans are exposed but which do not 
infect humans. Level 2 indicates viruses that can infect humans 
but are not transmitted from humans. Level 3 indicates viruses 
that can infect and be transmitted from humans but are restricted 
to self-limiting outbreaks. Level 4 indicates viruses that are 
capable of epidemic spread in human populations. Transitions 
between levels (indicated by arrows) correspond to different 
stages of virus emergence in human populations. Reprinted from 
Woolhouse et al. (10).
 Epidemic Potential of RNA and DNA Viruses
is emergence from nonhuman primates, with suggestions 
that primate viruses are more likely to be able to, or to ac-
quire the ability to, spread in human populations (13,14). 
However, emergence of human transmissible viruses from 
bat (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus) 
or bird (e.g., influenza) reservoirs indicates that this trait is 
associated with a wide range of reservoirs.
Level 2 to Levels 3 and 4
The possibility that level 2 viruses might acquire the ca-
pacity to be transmitted between humans (i.e., move into 
level 3 or 4) is a major concern, especially in the context 
of influenza A(H5N1) virus and other avian influenza virus 
subtypes. However, there are few examples of this transi-
tion throughout the entire recorded history of human virus-
es going back to 1901. One possible example involves the 
simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) and HIV. A SIVsmm-
derived laboratory strain of SIV has been reported to infect 
humans, but without onward transmission (15). SIVsmm is 
related to HIV-2. SIVcpz, which is related to HIV-1, has not 
been directly observed in humans. However, different HIV-
1 lineages, independently derived from SIVcpz, are variably 
transmissible in humans, and the pandemic HIV-1 M lin-
eage was the only virus to overcome a key host restriction 
factor (human tetherin) (16). The only other examples of 
viruses newly transmitted between humans relate to rare 
instances of iatrogenic transmission (e.g., Colorado tick fe-
ver or rabies viruses).
Epidemiologic and phylogenetic considerations rou-
tinely inform our assessment of the likelihood of human-
to-human transmission being observed in the future. For 
example, there is markedly less concern about rabies virus 
than about avian influenza virus, and we suggest 2 reasons 
for this observation. First, rabies virus has a much longer 
history of and a much higher incidence of human infection, 
but human-to-human transmission is extremely rare. Sec-
ond, there is no evidence that other rhabdoviruses viruses 
(with the possible exception of Bas-Congo virus, which 
represents a novel genus) are transmissible in humans (or 
primates more generally).
Level 3 to Level 4
Level 3 viruses can also become level 4 viruses. We note 
that virus evolution is not (necessarily) required for R0 
to become >1 in human populations. Differences in host 
(or vector) behavior, ecology, or demography might be 
sufficient (8).
Instances of shifts from level 3 to level 4 in recent 
times have been infrequent. Three candidates are Ebolavi-
rus, Zika virus, and chikungunya virus. However, although 
these viruses have caused epidemics of unprecedented size 
in humans populations in the past decade, the condition 
R0>1 in human populations might had been previously met 
for all 3 viruses (17–19).
For Ebola virus, the epidemic in West Africa in 2014 
constituted the first appearance of this virus in high-den-
sity, urban populations, which is expected to correspond 
to a higher value of R0. The chikungunya virus epidemic 
in the Indian Ocean region in 2005 was associated with a 
vector species jump (from Aedes aegypti to Ae. albopictus 
mosquitoes) that has been linked to a mutation in the vi-
rus envelope 1 protein gene (18). The chikungunya virus 
epidemic in the Caribbean region in 2013 followed the first 
appearance of chikungunya in the Americas and infected 
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Table 2. Viruses (n = 37) that are known or suspected of being transmissible (directly or indirectly) between humans but to date have 
been restricted to short transmission chains or self-limiting outbreaks 
Genome, virus family  Virus name 
Single-stranded RNA (ambisense)  
 Arenaviruses Guanarito, Junin, Lassa, Lujo, Machupo, Sabia, Dandenong,*  
lymphocytic choriomeningitis* 
 Bunyaviruses Andes, Bwamba, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Oropouche, Rift Valley,  
severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome 
Single-stranded RNA (positive sense)  
 Flaviviruses Japanese encephalitis,* Usutu,* West Nile* 
 Coronaviruses Middle East respiratory syndrome 
 Togaviruses Barmah Forest, o’nyong-nyong, Ross River, Semliki Forest,  
Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
Single-stranded RNA (negative sense)  
 Filoviruses Bundibugyo Ebola, Lake Victoria Marburg, Sudan Ebola 
 Paramyxoviruses Nipah 
 Rhabdoviruses Bas-Congo, rabies* 
Double-stranded RNA  
 Reoviruses Nelson Bay, Colorado tick fever* 
Double-stranded DNA  
 Adenoviruses Titi monkey 
 Herpesviruses Macacine herpesvirus 1 
 Polyomaviruses Simian virus 40 
 Poxviruses Monkeypox, Orf, vaccinia 
*Human transmission of these viruses is known only by iatrogenic or vertical routes. 
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populations that had no history of exposure to the virus. 
The current Zika virus epidemic in South America appears 
to be another example of a transition from a level 3 to a 
level 4 arbovirus associated with geographic spread into 
areas with high densities of vectors (19). Occasional Zika 
virus transmission directly from infected humans to other 
humans are of considerable interest, but probably contrib-
ute little to R0.
Chikungunya, Zika and the other level 4 arboviruses 
(yellow fever and dengue viruses) illustrate that, for arbo-
viruses, a high potential for spread in human populations 
is linked to carriage by anthropophilic vector species, par-
ticularly mosquitoes of the genus Aedes. In contrast, no 
tick species are regarded as anthropophilic, and there are 
no level 4 and few level 3 tickborne arboviruses.
Epidemiologic Patterns
The preceding sections illustrate that identifying transitions 
of viruses between level 2 and level 3 or between level 3 
and level 4 is not always straightforward. Standard epide-
miologic theory can help clarify our expectations.
As we discussed, pyramid level is related to the ba-
sic reproduction number R0 in human populations. In turn, 
the value of R0 is indicative of expected outbreak dynam-
ics. Some key results (Figure 2) are the probability that a 
single primary case will generate >1 secondary cases (for 
any value of R0), the expected average size of an outbreak 
generated (over the range 0<R0<1), and the probability 
that an epidemic will spread in the human population (for 
R0>1). These results strictly apply to homogeneous infec-
tions in a homogeneous host population, although more 
general frameworks can accommodate host or pathogen 
heterogeneity (20–22). Nonetheless, the key predictions 
that secondary cases do not always occur even if R0>0 
and that major epidemics do not always occur even if R0>1 
are robust.
From an epidemiologic perspective, our confidence 
that a putatively level 2 virus is truly incapable of human-
to-human transmission is thus a function of the number of 
index cases observed. The transition between level 3 and 
level 4 can be studied in terms of the expected distribu-
tion of outbreak sizes (23). In the range 0<R0<1, an over-
dispersed distribution of outbreak sizes is expected: most 
outbreaks are small (often just single cases) with a long 
tail of larger outbreaks. This pattern has been reported for 
a range of emerging viral diseases (Figure 3). As the criti-
cal threshold R0 = 1 is approached, this value is signaled in 
the outbreak size distribution (Figure 3). This framework 
has been used successfully to monitor the epidemiology of 
measles virus in the United Kingdom after a decrease in 
childhood vaccination rates in the late 1990s and indicated 
the approach to the critical threshold that corresponded to 
loss of herd immunity (23).
Outbreak size distribution analysis has been applied 
to human case data for Andes virus (24), monkeypox vi-
rus (20), and MERS-CoV (25) (Figure 3). For EVD up to 
2013, data are clearly inconsistent with theoretical expecta-
tion for R0<1 (Figure 3), which suggests that large num-
bers of small outbreaks have remained undetected or that 
R0 was already >1 in at least some settings. Either way, 
R0≈1 for EVD in humans implies that small differences 
in the biology or epidemiology of the virus would lead to 
large changes in scale of outbreaks (8), which could make 
events such as the EVD epidemic in 2014, if not predict-
able, then much less unexpected.
Evolution
Changes in pyramid level might be mediated by virus evo-
lution or changes in virus ecology (28). A major issue is 
whether the capacity of a virus to spread in human popula-
tions arises as a result of adaptation (evolution of trans-
missibility that occurs during human infection) or pread-
aptation (genetic variation within nonhuman reservoirs that 
predisposes a virus not only to infect humans but also trans-
mit between humans, noting that RNA viruses often show 
high levels of genetic variation such that they are some-
times described as quasi-species [29]). These alternatives 
have been characterized as tailor-made and off-the-shelf, 
respectively (28). The first alternative implies a progres-
sion from no or low transmissibility between humans to 
moderate or high transmissibility. The second alternative 
implies moderate or high transmissibility at first infection 
of humans.
We consider that our survey of documented changes 
of pyramid level is most consistent with the off-the-shelf 
model of virus emergence. In particular, we can find no 
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Figure 2. Expected outbreak dynamics for RNA and DNA viruses 
given a single primary case in a large, previously unexposed host 
population, as a function of the basic reproduction number R0. 
Mean size of outbreak as total number of cases (N) is given by 
N = 1/(1 − R0) for R0<1 (light gray line, left axis). Probability of 0 
secondary cases (i.e., outbreak size N = 1) is given by P1 =  
exp(−R0) (black line, right axis). Probability of a major outbreak is 
given by Ptakeoff = 1 – 1/R0 for R0>1 (dark gray line, right axis).
 Epidemic Potential of RNA and DNA Viruses
convincing examples of level 2 viruses becoming level 3 
or 4 viruses, which suggests that, if this happens at all, it 
typically happens sufficiently rapidly (i.e., requires a suf-
ficiently small number of introductions) that we fail to ob-
serve the level 2 phase. In contrast, we regularly observe 
viruses at levels 3 or 4 the first time they are detected in 
human populations.
Nonetheless, the possibility of virus evolution of 
transmissibility in a new host has been demonstrated ex-
perimentally for influenza A(H5N1) virus in ferrets (30). A 
theoretical study (31) suggested that the fact that this virus 
subtype has been circulating widely in poultry populations, 
with frequent human exposure and sporadic human infec-
tion for almost 20 years, provides little or no reassurance 
about its future evolutionary trajectory.
HIV lineages show clear evidence of adaptation to hu-
mans (16), but as discussed earlier, it is not clear whether 
the SIV lineages that gave rise to HIV-1 or HIV-2 were ca-
pable of transmission between human hosts. We speculate 
that extended infection times make tailor-made emergence 
more likely for retroviruses.
Transmission
Demonstrating that an infected human has the potential 
to transmit the infection to another human is not always 
straightforward. High virus titers in body secretions and 
excretions, blood, or skin are considered indicative. Case 
clusters are suggestive, but if persons occupy the same 
environment (e.g., household), then it might be difficult 
to rule out common exposure. Case clusters must be epi-
demiologically plausible (i.e., delimited in space and time 
in a manner consistent with the known or assumed epide-
miology of the virus). Genotyping techniques are useful 
tools for confirming a cluster but do not resolve the source 
of infection.
For several of the viruses we studied (e.g., Bas-Con-
go, Lujo, Nelson Bay, and severe fever with thrombo-
cytopenia syndrome viruses) (Table 2), the evidence for 
human-to-human transmission is best regarded as tenta-
tive, particularly where putative clusters were small. Such 
assessments can be even more difficult for vectorborne 
viruses. In many situations, the best evidence for the hu-
man-to-human transmission will come from analysis of 
virus genome sequences.
Phylogenetic Analysis
One approach to resolving the question of human-to-hu-
man transmission is analysis of nucleotide sequence data, 
sometimes referred to as forensic phylogenetics. Nucleo-
tide substitution rates in fast-evolving RNA viruses, such 
as MERS-CoV and Ebola virus, are ≈1–5 × 10–3/site/year 
(32,33), making it possible to use sequences isolated from 
different hosts at different times to estimate time-resolved 
phylogenetic trees. Estimates of the transmission chain 
from temporal sequence data can be improved by incorpo-
rating additional information on the date of onset of indi-
vidual cases, duration of latent and infectious periods, and 
overall prevalence (34).
We provide some example phylogenetic trees gener-
ated from simulated epidemics (Figure 4). In an epidemic 
in an animal reservoir with occasional transmission to hu-
mans (Figure 4, panel A), for each human sequence, the 
most closely related next sequence is of animal origin. 
Clusters of closely related human sequences are shown, 
and the distribution of the expected cluster sizes is a func-
tion of R0 (Figure 4, panels B, C) (35).
In an outbreak, it might be difficult to find and sample 
the putative source animal cases. However, estimating the 
time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of the hu-
man cases will indicate how long the infection has been 
spreading. For sporadic zoonoses (Figure 4, panel A), most 
transmission has occurred unobserved in the animal res-
ervoir, and the TMRCA of pairs of human cases will be 
long because these sequences are not closely related. For 
outbreaks involving human-to-human transmission (Fig-
ure 4, panels B, C), the TMRCA of the cluster of human 
cases will be closer to the date of the first human infection 
(whether sampled or not) and provides the estimated date 
of the zoonotic event.
Use of sequence data to distinguish between multiple 
instances of human infection from a common animal source 
and human-to-human transmission in the early stages of an 
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Figure 3. Distribution of outbreak sizes for RNA and DNA viruses 
as plots of outbreak size x (horizontal axis) versus fraction of 
outbreaks of size >x (vertical axis), both on logarithmic scales. 
Data are shown for 4 infectious diseases. Squares indicates 
Andes virus disease in South America (24); diamonds indicate 
monkeypox in Africa (26); circles indicate Middle East respiratory 
syndrome in the Middle East (25); and triangles indicate filovirus 
(all species) diseases in Africa before 2013 (27). For comparison, 
expected values for the case R0 = 1, obtained from the  
expression for the probability of an outbreak of size >x, P(x) =  
Γ(x – ½)/√πΓ(x), are also shown (dashed line). Data for filoviruses 
are not consistent with expectation for R0<1.
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outbreak is extremely challenging because of short times-
cales, and involvement of few mutations. However, genetic 
differences and phylogenetic evidence show that at least 2 
of the first 3 reported cases of influenza A (H7N9) virus in-
fection in humans were believed to originate from distinct 
domestic avian sources (36).
Further sequencing of avian samples implied that a 
low-pathogenicity influenza A(H7N9) virus strain had 
been spreading in domestic birds for ≈1 year before spo-
radic cases were detected in humans (37). Similarly, detec-
tion of genetically distant lineages of MERS-CoV, which 
persisted for only a few months each, suggest multiple 
introductions from an animal reservoir and only limited 
human-to-human transmission to date (32). In contrast, 
the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009 and the EVD 
epidemic in West Africa in 2014 were believed to be the 
results of single zoonotic events, followed by sustained 
human-to-human transmission (33), as shown by a single 
rapidly expanding lineage.
Conclusions
Our survey of the capacity of RNA and DNA virus infec-
tions to be transmitted, directly or indirectly, between hu-
mans leads to several conclusions and practical suggestions 
for improving surveillance of emerging infectious diseases 
and targeting efforts to identify future public health threats. 
In support of these conclusions, the World Health Orga-
nization recently published list of priority emerging infec-
tious diseases and corresponding viruses (38) included 6 of 
the viruses in Table 2.
A major observation is that the taxonomic diversity of 
viruses that are possible threats to public health is wide, but 
bounded. Most human infective viruses are closely related 
to viruses of other mammals and some to viruses of birds. 
There are no indications that humans acquire new viruses 
from any other source. However, diversification within hu-
man populations occurs and is a prominent feature of some 
DNA virus taxa (e.g., family Papillomaviridae) (4).
In general, however, our knowledge of origins of hu-
man viruses is still incomplete. Although the origins of 
HIV-1 have been extensively investigated (16), for most 
other viruses, even level 4 viruses, little or no research has 
occurred. An origins initiative (9) would help establish 
the routes into human populations that have been used by 
other viruses.
Transmissibility within human populations is a key de-
terminant of epidemic potential. Many viruses that can in-
fect humans are not capable of being transmitted by humans; 
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Figure 4. Phylogenetic trees for 
simulated emerging infectious 
disease outbreaks caused by 
RNA and DNA viruses in a mixed 
population of 1,000 human and 
5,000 nonhuman hosts. Trees 
were constructed by using a 
standard susceptible–infected–
removed model (6). For each of 3 
infection scenarios in nonhuman 
hosts (black lines), rare zoonotic 
transmission events (blue lines), 
human-to-human transmission 
(red lines), and human cases 
(red circles) are indicated. For 
the nonhuman population R0 = 2 
throughout. Transmissibility within 
the human populations varies from 
A) spillover: no human−human 
transmission (R0 = 0); B) limited 
human−human transmission with 
R0 = 1; and C) epidemic spread 
within humans (R0>1). A maximum 
of 100 infections are randomly 
sampled from each population in 
each simulated outbreak. 
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most human transmissible viruses that emerge already have 
that capability at first human infection or acquire it relatively 
rapidly. If transmission from humans would require a change 
in a phylogenetically conserved trait, such as tissue tropism 
or transmission route (4), then such viral paradigm shifts will 
probably be extremely rare (39).
Even when a virus is capable of transmission between 
humans, the critical threshold R0>1 is not always achieved. 
However, because changes in virus traits or host population 
characteristics can influence R0, level 3 viruses (Table 2) 
are of special interest from a public health perspective, and 
of special concern when, like MERS-CoV, they also cause 
severe illness. Demonstrating human transmissibility is of-
ten difficult, but essential. The best evidence is likely to 
come from virus genome sequencing studies. These studies 
should be a public health priority (40).
We currently have few clues to help us predict which 
mammalian or avian viruses might pose a threat to hu-
mans and, especially, which might be transmissible be-
tween humans. One argument in favor of experimental 
studies of these traits, including controversial gain of 
function experiments (30), is that they could help guide 
molecular surveillance for high-risk virus lineages in non-
human reservoirs.
The first line of defense against emerging viruses is ef-
fective surveillance (40). A better understanding of which 
kinds of viruses in which circumstances pose the greatest 
risk to human health would enable evidence-based target-
ing of surveillance efforts, which would reduce costs and 
increase probable effectiveness of this endeavor.
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